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National pride is to countries what self-respect is to 
individuals: a necessary condition for self-improvement.   
Too much national pride can produce bellicosity and 
imperialism, just as excessive self-respect can produce 
arrogance.  But just as too little self-respect makes it 
difficult for a person to display moral courage, so 
insufficient national pride makes energetic and effective 
debate about national policy unlikely.  – Richard Rorty1 
 
General Introduction 
 
ichard McKay Rorty (1931-2007), undoubtedly one of the greatest 
American philosophers of the late twentieth- and early twenty-first-
centuries, was a professor of philosophy, humanities, and comparative 
literature at the universities of Princeton, Virginia, and Stanford.  He started his 
philosophical journey by immersing himself in the idealism of Plato (428-347 
B.C.), and in the dialectics of G.W.F.  Hegel (1770-1831), but unable to find 
intellectual satisfaction from them, he returned to the pragmatism of his 
parents’ friend   John Dewey (1859-1952).   
But Rorty’s journey back to the familial pragmatic philosophy had 
been tempered with his exposure to Jacques Derrida (1930-2004), Martin 
Heidegger (1889-1976) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), making his neo-
pragmatic musings a blend of the state of the art of theorizing from both the 
twentieth-century Anglo-American and the post-Nietzschean continental 
traditions.  As to his distinctive leftist political leaning, he traces them back to a 
boyhood that was nurtured by steadfast Trotskyist, socialist, and labor activist 
parents.2   
He served as president of the American Philosophical Association and 
ironically developed an anti-philosophical view, that philosophy is not a 
privileged discourse, which he lived out by taking teaching jobs in humanities 
and comparative literature.  When he died of pancreatic cancer, he left behind a 
                                                 
1  Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998).   
2 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope (London: Penguin Books, 1999), 5-8. 
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6     RICHARD RORTY’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
body of works that possesses astounding implications not only on 
contemporary metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and political philosophy, but 
also on social and cultural theories.         
Philippine postcolonialism has its early origins in the late nineteenth-
century nationalistic writings from the propaganda movement, the anti-Spanish 
revolution and the early American period.  Its growth, however, was stunted by 
the systematic reformation of the Filipino mind with Anglo-American 
literature, values and culture.  It began to redevelop only in the 1950s, in the 
colonial set-up of the University of the Philippines.  By the 1970s and 1980s, 
our local postcolonialism had already fostered three robust schools of thought, 
the Sikolohiyang Pilipino, Pilipinolohiya, and Pantayong Pananaw.  However, after 
more than half a century from its full emergence in 1950s, our local 
postcolonialism seems to have remained confined within our progressive 
academic centers, unable to fully alter the tone of our collective academic 
discourses, and unable to unshackle the colonial bondage of the Filipino mind.   
In this this paper, I will attempt to extract some insights from Rorty’s 
neo-pragmatic political philosophy with the aim of enriching and fortifying our 
local postcolonial projects by giving justice to their agenda and methods, 
critiquing their current status, and providing them a clearer sense of direction 
and vision.  As a preliminary step in order to accomplish this core task this 
paper would take a look at three things: 1) the main tenets of Rorty’s political 
philosophy; 2) the highlights of Philippine post-colonial researches and 
theorizations; and 3) the epistemological, political, directional and modal 
difficulties encountered by these local post-colonial projects. 
 
Rorty’s Neopragmatic Political Philosophy 
 
  Rorty self-consciously places himself within the pragmatic tradition, a 
school of thought founded by Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), popularized 
by William James (1842-1910), and philosophically expounded by F.C.S.   
Schiller (1864-1937) and John Dewey.  Pragmatism, the most dominant 
American philosophy during the early part of the twentieth century, hinges on 
the ideas that theories are conceptual tools that man uses in grappling with 
whatever project or concern he has at hand, and therefore the ‘truthfulness’ of 
such ideas and theories is measured by their success in accomplishing their 
specific tasks.  Pragmatists do not actually ask whether a particular theory is 
true or false, rather they ask whether a particular theory has proven itself 
effective or not.  Their core interest in epistemology spreads through the 
studies of law, education, politics, social theory, and culture (Thayer, 1992, p.  
636).    
    If Peirce, James, Schiller and Dewey were the classic American 
pragmatists, Rorty identifies W.V.O.  Quine (1908-2000), Nelson Goodman 
(1906-1998), Hilary Putnam (born: 1926) and Donald Davidson (1917-2003) as 
the leading neo-pragmatists.3  He points out that what differentiates the neo-
                                                 
3 Ibid., 25.  
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pragmatists from the classical pragmatists is the so-called ‘linguistic turn’ that 
happened during the 1940s and 1950s when these younger philosophers, taking 
their cue from Gottlob Frege (1848-1925), abandoned the classic analysis of 
experience in favor of the analysis of language.   
  Although Rorty took this same linguistic turn, he insists that he aligns 
himself more with Dewey’s philosophy.  “The philosopher whom I most 
admire, and of whom I should most like to think of myself as a disciple,” he 
writes, “is John Dewey.”4  His reason for doing so is that Dewey was the one 
who convinced him to abandon the Platonic and Kantian search for the 
timeless and normative foundations of human knowledge and actions, and 
inspired him instead to focus on the sustained and systematic hoping for the 
betterment of humanity. 
  As a neo-pragmatist, Rorty distinguishes himself from the group of 
Quine, Goodman, Putnam and Davidson, by highlighting his concern for 
ethics, politics, and the American culture, which this group had thematically 
neglected.  He explains that the other neo-pragmatists had been bound by the 
spell of Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) who insisted that philosophy should focus 
on logic and should steer away from politics and culture.5  Quine happened to 
be a student of Carnap, while Goodman and Davidson happened to be 
students of Quine.  Although Putnam was able to wiggle out of this Carnapian 
boundary, he did so only in the later part of his philosophical career.  Another 
crucial difference between Rorty and the other neo-pragmatists is that they are 
steeped in the Anglo-American analytic tradition, while he is constructively 
exposed to the post-Nietzschean continental tradition.   
  Rorty’s political philosophy, although more engaging and earthly than 
his rather abstruse epistemology and ethics, is intimately connected with them.  
Hence, before tackling the political aspects of his thought, it is necessary to 
have a cursory look on his theories of truth, mind, and ethics, as well as on his 
idea of what philosophy ought to be. 
 
Theory of Truth 
 
  Rorty’s theory of truth can be more easily grasped when seen as a 
reaction against the two dominant and older theories of truth.  The first of 
these is the correspondence theory, which claims that a statement is true if 
such statement agrees with the reality it describes.  The second of these is the 
coherence theory, which claims that a statement is true if such statement agrees 
with its kindred statements within a given system of knowledge.  After the so-
called ‘linguistic turn’ both theories of truth encountered some radical crises.   
  In an epoch when reality is considered as basically chaotic and 
unknowable and as intelligible only through language, the theory of 
correspondence lost its guarantor of truth.  Beyond the statement is now an 
incomprehensible and unintelligible terrain.  There is no more point in looking 
                                                 
4 Ibid., xvi. 
5 Ibid., 25.  
 
 
8     RICHARD RORTY’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
for any possible agreement between such statement and the flux of reality that 
it describes.  After the linguistic turn what remains is the statement, and 
without the possibility of its empirical verification, the correspondence theory 
of truth ceases to make sense. 
  In this same epoch, even the coherence theory of truth, which was 
supposed to be autonomous from reality, is shaken to its very foundation.  At a 
closer look, the coherence theory would turn out to be not absolutely 
autonomous from reality, for it requires that in a given system of knowledge at 
least some of its statements are empirically verifiable.  For the coherence 
theory, it is these empirically verifiable statements that serve as anchors to 
prevent a given system of knowledge from soaring freely towards the heavens.  
Without aspects of the real world to latch on to, a system of knowledge could 
still be perfectly coherent, but it is exposed to the danger of being totally 
nonsensical and irrelevant.  Hence, after the linguistic turn, the coherence 
theory is seriously disabled.   
  To prevent intellectual nihilism and anarchy, Rorty replaces the 
correspondence theory with the pragmatist theory of truth, where a statement 
is no longer seen as a report of some aspects of reality, but a conceptual tool 
that man utilizes in accomplishing a given task.  Pragmatists, as already 
mentioned, measure the ‘truthfulness’ of a statement no longer by its 
agreement with the reality it describes, but by its effectiveness in accomplishing 
its intended task.   
  On the other hand, Rorty’s adaptation of the pragmatic theory of truth 
remedied the crisis encountered by the coherence theory of truth by giving it 
an additional criterion: a statement is true, not only when it agrees with its 
kindred statements within a given system of knowledge, but also when it is 
effective in accomplishing its intended task.  Hence, even if the linguistic turn 
had dissolved the aspects of reality that a system of knowledge could have 
latched on to, this system of knowledge need not soar towards the nonsensical 
and irrelevant heavens because it is accountable to the question “are its 
statements effective in accomplishing their intended tasks?” 
  Rorty initially emphasizes that ideas and theories that are effective in 
creating a better future for humanity are true, while those that are ineffective 
are not true.  But sooner he radicalizes the pragmatic theory of truth by arguing 
that philosophy should stop asking about the nature of truth, for truth may not 
have a nature in the first place; and man should stop thinking that goal of his 
inquiries is truth, for to say truth is his goal would mean that he is capable of 
grasping truth once he attains it.  Instead of being obsessed with truth, 
philosophers should focus on hoping for a better future.  Rorty states: “One 
should stop worrying about whether what one believes is well grounded and 
start worrying about whether one has been imaginative enough to think up 
interesting alternatives to one’s present beliefs.”6  In the end, he transforms the 
theory of truth into a theory of hope.   
 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 34.  
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Theory of Mind 
 
Rorty’s theory of truth, or of hope, would become clearer once     
contextualized in his theory of the mind.  In the western world, the idea of the 
human mind had been predominantly shaped by Rene Descartes (1596-1650), 
with his image of the mind as something that is prone to error but is 
nevertheless capable of representing reality through systematic doubting and 
some stringent methods; as well as by John Locke (1632-1704), with his image 
of the mind as initially an empty slate that would be gradually filled up with 
representations of reality through the processes of sensation and reflection.  
The dominant western idea of the mind is therefore representational, where it 
is conceptualized as a space, or a stage, in which and upon which 
reproductions from the real world are created, stored, and recreated.    
Rorty argues that with this representational theory of the mind, it is 
but expected that philosophy sooner or later would be led to the thorny 
question of how can it be assured that such mental reproductions are faithful 
to their references in the real world.  For him, the only way to avoid this 
unpleasant problem is to scrap the Cartesian-Lockean representational model, 
and instead follow the other pragmatists in adopting the causal model 
proposed by Charles Darwin (1809-1882).  He states: “So they start with 
Darwinian account of human beings as animals doing their best to cope with 
the environment—doing their best to develop tools which will enable them to 
enjoy more pleasure and less pain.”7  Concepts, ideas and theories happened to 
be some of man’s most powerful tools.      
In the Darwinian causal model, the mind is construed as a tool-making 
capacity that enables man to deal with the often harsh outside world, and 
ceases to be a space or stage where thinking is supposed to hapen.  In this 
causal model, the concepts, ideas, and theories that were previously thought to 
populate the mind are recast by Rorty into linguistic entities.  After the 
linguistic turn, there are no longer such things as pre-linguistic concepts, ideas, 
and theories.  In this epoch, thinking is nothing but a silent monologue where 
the self articulates ideas, experiences, feelings, intentions and theories through 
language. 
With the Darwinian causal model, the old question on how philosophy 
can be assured that the concepts, ideas and theories inside the mind are faithful 
to reality is replaced with the more pressing question on how philosophy can 
be assured that the concepts, ideas and theories produced by the mind are 
effective tools in dealing with the contingencies of the outside world. 
 
Ethical Theory 
 
  Rorty’s ethical theory could be seen as an elaboration and application 
of his more central epistemological theory.  This theory may be summed up in 
the statement: actions that are effective in creating a better future for humanity 
                                                 
7 Ibid., xxii-xxiii.  
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are morally superior than actions that are ineffective.  In justifying this 
pragmatic moral principle, he makes use of Dewey’s Darwinian thinking 
  Dewey explained the emergence of ethics by blurring the difference 
between ‘prudence’ and ‘morality’.  For him, ‘prudence,’ or ‘habit,’ or ‘custom,’ 
is a routine, semi-conscious and unproblematic response of man to his day to 
day circumstances.  But once man is plunged into a situation which is no 
longer routine, he realizes that he could not anymore rely on prudence, or 
habit, or custom.   Some examples of this non-routine situation is when this 
person’s needs clashes with those of his family, or when his family’s interests 
collide with those of his neighbors,’ or when a once peaceful community is 
fractured by war due to an economic trigger, or when one society has to deal 
with another alien society.8  In situations like these, man would suddenly find 
himself in need of some guidelines other than those provided by prudence, 
habit, or custom.   For Dewey and for Rorty, this situation is the beginning of 
morality.  Rorty states: “We invent both (morality and law) when we can no 
longer just do what comes naturally, when routine is no longer good enough, 
or when habit and custom no longer suffice.”9  Thus, prudence, habit, custom 
are merely different from morality and law in terms of degree of articulation 
and explicitness.  In terms of kind and quality, they are all the same in being 
man’s responses to his day to day circumstances. 
  Just as prudence, habit and custom are there to make man more 
effective in dealing with his social world, so are morality and law.  Instead of 
grounding morality and law on the inscrutable will of God, Rorty suggests to 
ask the more earthy question of whether such things are indeed making man 
more effective in dealing with his social world.   In Rorty’s Deweyan-
Darwinian ethical theory, moral progress is seen as man’s capacity to factor in 
more and more people, and more and more aspects of his world, in figuring 
out which actions could contribute to the creation of a better future for 
humanity and which actions could only hinder. 
 
The Idea of Philosophy 
 
  In a world that is devoid of substances, essences, objective moral 
principles, and a world that is practically an unintelligible terrain, we could only 
wonder what remains to be done for philosophy.  As already mentioned, Rorty 
had adopted an anti-philosophical view that dethroned philosophy as a 
privileged discourse, and he lived out this belief by taking teaching jobs in 
humanities and comparative literature.  But what is precisely his idea of 
philosophy? Is it really something antagonistic to the very same discipline from 
which he is, and unto which, he is theorizing?  Is there still something 
significant left for philosophy to accomplish after the linguistic turn? 
  Rorty’s anti-philosophical view, however, does not really intend to kill 
philosophy.  On the contrary he aims to transform and rehabilitate it to make it 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 73. 
9 Ibid.  
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more adaptable to the new epoch where reality is replaced by language.  His 
anti-philosophical view was in fact a preventive theorizing to keep philosophy 
from dying a natural death. 
  One of the most conspicuous items in Rorty’s idea of philosophy is its 
lack of substantive difference with the other discourses.  He asserts:  “For 
pragmatists there is no sharp break between natural science and social science, 
nor between social science and politics, nor between politics, philosophy and 
literature.  All areas of culture are parts of the same endeavor to make life 
better.”10  
After the linguistic turn, philosophy is no longer expected to search 
for ultimate truths, or to act as the tribunal of reason that could critique and 
evaluate institutions and discourses.  Instead, it is expected to work hand in 
hand with the other disciplines in re-describing the world and in expressing 
hope to make a better place for humanity.  Rorty would even think that 
literature could do this job better than philosophy, for it can more powerfully 
reinterpret the world and emotively slither into the convictions of its readers.    
  If there is one special task left for philosophy, it is to lead and join the 
other discourses in generating new vocabularies, descriptions and 
interpretations of the world.  Michael Lynch, in his essay Richard Rorty, 
comments: “The goal of the philosopher is not to map the landscape as it is, 
but change how we see the world; to paint new landscapes, new pictures.”11 
  But by giving up the function of being the tribunal of reason that 
could critique and evaluate institutions and discourses, this transformed 
philosophy would have difficulties in replacing older vocabularies, descriptions, 
and interpretations.  The pragmatic technique of declaring these older items as 
less effective would hardly suffice for the reason that in this consequentialist 
counter-argument one would need a longer time frame before a reliable verdict 
can be delivered.  The new items could only be proven to be better than the 
older items after the new items would have proven themselves effective in 
time.   
  Rorty believes that a shift from the old to the new could be attained by 
emotively convincing the people of the superiority of the new vocabularies, 
descriptions and interpretations.  He explains:  “The method is to redescribe 
lots and lots of things in new ways, until you have created a pattern of linguistic 
behavior which will tempt the rising generation to adopt it .  .  ..  This sort of 
philosophy does not work piece by piece, analyzing concept after concept, or 
testing thesis after thesis.  Rather it works holistically and pragmatically.”12 
  With a clearer picture of Rorty’s theories of truth, mind, and morality, 
as well as of his idea of philosophy, it would now be easier to tackle his 
political philosophy.  The following sub-sections, then, would explore his 
                                                 
10 Ibid., xxv. 
11 Michael Lynch, “Richard Rorty,”   in Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Detroit: Thomson 
Gale, 2006), 495.   
12 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), 9.  
 
 
12     RICHARD RORTY’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
general political theory, his critique of the American Left, and his critique of 
globalization. 
 
General Political Theory 
 
With very broad and sweeping strokes, we may think of Rorty’s 
political philosophy as a further elaboration and application of his theories of 
truth and morality.  In this manner, political actions that are effective in 
creating and building a better future for humanity are considered superior than 
actions that are less effective.  When asked what does ‘better’ mean for him, 
Rorty would reply better in the sense of having more freedom, more growth, 
more empathy, and more solidarity.   But when asked further why would more 
freedom, more growth, more empathy, and more solidarity make the situation 
better, his otherwise cohesive pragmatic reasoning would break down to give 
way to his so-called ‘liberal ironism’. 
  Rorty believes that a democratic and liberal government is a better 
form of political organization.  But the irony behind this belief is that it is not 
something that can be given a philosophical explanation.  His liberal ironism is 
all about refraining from laying down a solid philosophical justification for a 
particular form of government or ideology which proves itself to be superior to 
others, because there would never be such justification.  Inversely, liberal 
ironism is all about infusing philosophy with the liberal and democratic ideals 
of freedom, growth, empathy and solidarity.  It is this Rortian political ideology 
that made him transform philosophy into something that should work hand in 
hand with other disciplines in re-describing the world and in expressing hope 
to make it a better place for humanity.   
  Hence, with finer and more meticulous strokes, we should think of 
Rorty’s theories of truth and morality as further elaboration and application of 
his political philosophy, and not the other way around. 
 
Critique of the American Left 
 
As already mentioned, Rorty acknowledges his political leaning as 
leftist, a kind of leftism that can be traced back to a boyhood nurtured by 
steadfast Trotskyist, socialist, and labor activist parents.  He proudly recounts: 
“I grew up knowing that all decent people were, if not Trotskyites, at least 
socialists .  .  .  at 12, I knew that the point of being human was to spend one’s 
life fighting social justice.”13  His mature political ideology is expounded more 
clearly in his critique of the American leftist movement.   
  He begins his analysis with an emphasis on the significance of the left 
to a democratic society.  He calls it the ‘party of hope,’ in contrast to the often 
calcified right that is convinced there is nothing much to be changed from the 
status quo.14  The right believes that the country is basically sound and in good 
                                                 
13 Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, 6. 
14 Rorty, Achieving Our Country, 14.  
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shape, and looks at the left as a bunch of trouble-makers and utopian 
dreamers.   But it is actually the left that challenges the society to become 
better and better.  In America, one of the crucial issues that divide the right 
and the left is whether or not the government should take it as its responsibility 
to work for a more equitable redistribution of wealth.15   
  Rorty claims that the story of the 20th century American leftist 
movement is characterized by the succession of three groups: the old left, the 
new left and the cultural left.   For him, this succession is more like a descent 
into pessimism and political irrelevance instead of an evolution towards a left 
that is more and more capable of goading the democratic society towards a 
more egalitarian and prosperous future.   
  The old left pertains to “those Americans who, between 1900 and 
1964, struggled within the framework of constitutional democracy to protect 
the weak from the strong.”16  For him, this left included liberals and radicals, 
communists, and socialists, intellectuals, and unionized workers, and many 
other good-intentioned individuals who manifested their political beliefs in 
praxis.  This is the left to which his parents belonged and to which he identifies 
himself with.17   
  The old left was consumed with the ideals of Dewey and Walt 
Whitman (1819-1892) concerning becoming a decent and civilized society, love 
for country, and pride in being Americans.   Despite seeing and being vocal 
about the shortcomings of their country, the old left was intensely proud of the 
present and hopeful for the future of America.   
  This left accomplished so much, not only in improving the plight of 
the ‘people who were humiliated by poverty and unemployment,’ but more so 
in articulating the American spirit.18  Rorty explains:  “Without the American 
Left, we might still have been strong and brave, but nobody would have 
suggested that we were good.  As long as we have a functioning political Left, 
we still have a chance to achieve our country, to make it a country of 
Whitman’s and Dewey’s dreams.”19 
  As America entered into the 1960s, the strain of the Vietnam War, and 
the sufferings of the African-Americans became a wedge that divided the old 
left from what would later become the new left, that consisted of “people—
mostly students—who decided, around 1964, that it was no longer possible to 
work for social justice within the system.”20  Rorty notes that with the 
emergence of the new left, the alliance between the intellectuals and the 
unionized workers started to drift apart.   
                                                 
15 Ibid., 48. 
16 Ibid., 43. 
17 Derek Nystrom and Kent Puckett, “Against Oligarchies: A Conversation with 
Richard Rorty,” in Prickly Paradigm Press, Chicago <http://www.prickly-
paradigm.com/paradigm3.pdf>, 14 September 2007. 
18 Rorty, Achieving Our Country, 80. 
19 Ibid., 107. 
20 Ibid., 43.  
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  The new left was a movement that was overcast with hopelessness and 
pessimism.    From  its  perspective  there was something fundamentally 
wrong with America, sheer reforms cannot rectify this, and, hence, Americans 
should be ashamed of their country.   
  Despite its somber outlook, this new left accomplished some 
important things, such as putting and end to the Vietnam War, diminishing the 
rather loose powers of the CIA, and imposing a more stringent norm of 
truthfulness on the Defense Department.21  This new left, however, was short 
lived.  During the 1970s, it started to retreat into the sanctuaries of the 
American colleges and universities to become the academic left.   
  From the economic and political engagements of the old and the new 
left, the academe-based intellectuals started to dig deeper into the unconscious 
motives of oppression using Sigmund Freud’s (1856-1939) psychoanalytic lens 
and focused on sadism.  Rorty narrates: “With this partial substitution of Freud 
for Marx as a source of social theory, sadism rather than selfishness has 
become the principle target of the Left .  .  .  Many members of this Left 
specialize in what they call the ‘politics of difference’ or ‘of identity’ or ‘of 
recognition’.”22  Thus, instead of studying economic and political oppressions, 
the cultural left studied the concept of stigmata, such as femininity, 
homosexuality, and ethnicity; and instead of tracing oppression to human 
greed, this left delved into the sub-conscious psychosexual dynamics of culture.   
  The cultural left was not only overcast with hopelessness and 
pessimism, but with principled, theorized, and philosophical hopelessness and 
pessimism.  It carried no trace of the Deweyan and Whitmanesque ideals that 
buoyed the American spirit prior to the 1960s.   
  If the old and the new left accomplished great economic and political 
changes, the cultural left, similarly has accomplished some remarkable things: 
the propagation of impressive and scholarly discourses in cultural studies and 
the reduction of sadism in society, specifically by making male chauvinism, gay-
bashing, racism, and other forms of intolerance less and less acceptable.     
  Although the academic left is not the only leftist group in America, it 
happened to be the most significant left in the country at the moment.  Rorty, 
therefore, airs the necessity that this left should rethink its roles and obligations 
to American democracy.   He points out at least three fundamental problems 
hounding this left.  The first of these pertains to the academic left’s overall 
timbre of hopelessness and pessimism.  The right can only give the society its 
conservative ideology, and it is the left that should goad this same society to 
grow better and better.  But without hope and optimism, the left will never be 
able to accomplish its fundamental task.   Strong Deweyan and Whitmanesque 
hope and optimism are necessary if the academic left has to push the American 
society towards higher levels of cultural evolution.   
  The second of these problems pertains to the academic left’s lack of 
attention to the economic and political components of oppression.  Rorty 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 68. 
22 Ibid., 76-77.  
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warns that the gains made by the old and the new left are now being eroded by 
some powerful social changes.  Rorty emphasizes: “While the Left’s back was 
turned, the bourgeoisification of the white proletariat which began in the 
World War II and continued up through the Vietnam War has been halted, and 
the process has gone into reverse.  America is now proletarianizing its 
bourgeoisie, and this process is likely to culminate in a bottom-up populist 
revolt .  .  ..”23  While the critique of cultural sadism is good, it should not be 
done at the expense of studying economic and political sadism.  The cultural 
left must engage again in economic and political criticism to continue the 
struggles of the old and the new left.   
  The third of these problems pertains to the academic left’s loss of 
pride for America.   Rorty likens national pride to self-respect, which for an 
individual is a requirement for self-improvement.  What a country needs is 
sufficient pride: too much of it produces arrogance and belligerence, while too 
little of it produces timidity and lack of interest in political and economic 
affairs.   There is nothing wrong with the cultural left’s condemnation of 
America’s wrongdoings, but it should not also remain blind to the great things 
that America did.  Rorty explains: “Those who hope to persuade a nation to 
exert itself need to remind their country of what it can take pride in as well as 
what it should be ashamed of.  They must tell inspiring stories about episodes 
and figures in the nation’s past—episodes and figures to which the country 
should remain true.”24 
 
Critique of Globalization 
 
When Rorty mentioned the idea that the cultural left, by ignoring the 
economic and political aspects of oppression, had practically allowed the gains 
made by the old and the new left to be eroded by some powerful social 
changes, he had at the back of his mind the gargantuan image of globalization.   
His critique of the American left can even be construed as his way of bracing 
American democracy, and all the other democracies in the world, against the 
full impact of globalization.   
  We usually think that America is one of the few countries that is 
benefiting from the new global order, but Rorty deems otherwise.  He is very 
clear that the advantages reaped by some few American transnational 
corporations would not translate into advantages for the whole country.  On 
the contrary, he foresees that America would suffer as much as the other 
countries if the frenzied globalizing moves would finally spin out of control. 
  For Rorty, the present trend of American and European companies of 
putting up offshore operations on the low-wage areas of Asia and Africa, 
instead of on their respective base-countries, is already bad enough, as this 
diminishes the additional jobs for their workforce.  But the central problem 
with globalization is the fact that economic activities are going more and more 
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beyond the moderation and control of any one nation.  The few transnational 
corporations are fast gaining their autonomy and freedom to move their 
capitals and products through national boundaries.  By becoming citizens of 
many countries, these transnational corporations would actually become 
citizens to none.  Without emotional ties and commitment to a motherland, 
and without solidarity with their fellow citizens, they will just be motivated by 
profiteering even to the extent of impoverishing their base-country and 
oppressing their workers.   
  It would not take very long before a new domineering elite would 
emerge, an elite that is fewer but immensely more powerful and menacing than 
the nineteenth-century bourgeois.  This global ‘overclass’ would be the ones to 
make the major economic decisions for the world, completely unhampered by 
the legislatures of any one country.  In this scenario, citizens of any one 
country could no longer pressure their political leaders to moderate and control 
the rampaging moves of this global ‘overclass’.  Rorty expresses a stern 
warning: “The money accumulated by this overclass is as easily used for illegal 
purposes, such as supplying land mines to the latest entrepreneurial warlord or 
financing gangster takeovers of trade unions, as it is for legal ones.”25 
  When Rorty suggests to the cultural left that it re-engage with 
economic and political advocacies like what the old and new left did, he does 
not mean that the praxiological tasks waiting for the cultural left would be 
more or less similar to those of the pre-1960s or the pre-1970s.  Aside from the 
local economic and political matters, there are these totally new global 
economic and political matters that are shouting for the cultural left’s 
immediate attention.   
  Rorty could only give a general advice on the need for leftist 
intellectuals, from America and all the other countries, to band together and 
raise their fellow citizens’ consciousness about the dangers and threats 
spawned by globalization.  Both intellectuals and lay people should then 
convince their respective governments to lobby for a more powerful global 
polity that would be capable of moderating and controlling the otherwise 
immoderate and uncontrollable transnational corporations.  Rorty states: “Only 
global political institutions can offset the power of all that marvelously liquid 
and mobile capital.”26 
 
Postcolonial Discourses in the Philippines 
 
‘Postcolonialism,’ as it is known in the West, may be understood as a 
philosophical, literary, and social scientific critique of the conditions left behind 
by the European and American colonial dominations.  Its emergence may be 
traced back to the 1950 pamphlet,   Discourse on Colonialism, of the Martinican 
poet, novelist, politician and philosopher Aimé Césaire (1913-2008), and to the 
1952 book, Black Skin, White Mask, of another Martinican psychiatrist and 
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revolutionary Frantz Fanon (1925-1961).   Césaire’s work examines the brutal 
impact of capitalism and colonialism on both the colonizer and colonized, and 
exposes the contradictions and hypocrisy implicit in the western notions of 
‘progress’ and ‘civilization,’ specially when contrasted with the notions of   
‘savage,’ ‘uncultured,’ or ‘primitive’.   Side by side with the decolonization of 
his Caribbean society, he calls for a decolonization of the Caribbean mind and 
inner life.  Meanwhile, Fanon’s work looks beyond the systems of political and 
economic dominations and focuses on the psychoanalysis and phenomenology 
of colonialism.  He explores the ‘inferiorization’ and delusions of the colonized 
psyche, as well as the phobias and anxieties on the part of the colonizer. 
  Postcolonialism started with the theoretical and analytic tools of the 
hermeneutes of suspicion, Karl Marx (1818-1883), Freud, and Friedrich 
Nietzsche (1844-1900), as well as of the existential phenomenologist Jean-Paul 
Sartre (1905-1980).  Later on it appropriated the structuralist and post-
structuralist frameworks of Louis Althusser (1918-1990), Michel Foucault 
(1926-1984), Jacques Lacan (1915-1980) and Derrida.   
  The postcolonial discourses in the Philippines, however, sprouted 
independently from the two French-Caribbean theorists.   A careful reading of 
the nationalistic writings from the propaganda movement, the anti-Spanish 
revolution, and the early American period would easily reveal a number of 
postcolonial themes, such as the ‘inferiorization’ of the Indio, the manipulation 
of knowledge and language, the exploitation of colony, and the yearnings for 
freedom and independence.    
  But as the American occupation inundated the Filipino culture with 
‘civilizing’ and ‘humanizing’ American and English readings, and as a new 
breed of Filipino writers tried to imitate the form and content of this literature, 
our nationalistic discourses were marginalized and suppressed, reducing the 
once fiery Filipino nationalism into a hallow cliché of party politics.  Moreover, 
since these nationalistic discourses were generated during the colonial times, 
these would not technically qualify as postcolonial writings.   Our anti-Hispanic 
and anti-American musings, then, had to wait for almost half a century before 
they could be articulated and developed again into full-blown postcolonialism. 
  After we gained independence from American rule, two streams of 
thought emerged and later on combined to generate a full-blown tradition of 
Philippine postcolonial discourses.  The first of these streams was the 
revitalized nationalism emanating from Claro M.  Recto’s (1890-1960) political-
economic critique of our country’s foreign policy that inspired a number of 
politicians and intellectuals to unmask our bondage to American neo-
colonialism.27  The most notable among Recto’s followers were Leon Maria 
Guerrero, Lorenzo Tanada, Jose W.  Diokno, and Renato Constantino.   
  The second of these streams pertained to the acute crisis experienced 
by some social scientists at the University of the Philippines upon realizing the 
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fundamental incongruity between the Western social theories that they learned 
abroad and the Philippine realities that they were investigating.28  The story 
behind this academic crisis is intimately bound to the history of our country’s 
prime university.  In 1908, the University of the Philippines started out with its 
all-American faculty and administrators, but sooner it realized that it would be 
much cheaper for the American government to train Filipino academicians in 
the United States and bring them back to staff the same university.  The 
Filipino recipients of this scheme came to be known as the   pensionados, and the 
earliest of them naively struggled to uncritically transplant on our native soil 
the theories they learned in America.  But as their research requirements 
dictated that they do more and more field work, it dawned on them that their 
imported framework simply would not fit squarely on the Philippine realities.29    
  Sooner, Rectos’ revitalized nationalism and the pensionados’ search for 
local alternative frameworks coalesced into a social theory that is both 
nationalist and anti-colonial.  In the 1950s and 1960s, our local postcolonialism 
retained its independence from Césaire and Fanon’s foundational works. 
  Lily Mendoza, in her work Between the Homeland and the Diaspora, 
recounts the names of some other pioneering Filipino postcolonialists: 
Leonardo Mercado in philosophy; F.  Landa Jocano, Ponciano Bennagen, and 
Prospero Covar in anthropology; Felipe De Leon in humanities; Virgilio 
Enriquez in psychology; and Zeus Salazar in history.30  To her rather limited 
list we may add Teodoro Agoncillo in history; F.  Sionil Jose, Beinvenido 
Lumbera and Isagani Cruz in literature; Alice Guillermo and Nicanor Tiongson 
in humanities; and Walden Bello in social economics.   
  Among these innovative Filipino critics and scholars, Enriquez, Covar 
and Salazar stand out for having generated the enduring schools of thought, 
Sikolohiyang Pilipino, Pilipinolohiya and  Pantayong Pananaw.  Mendoza states: 
“These three .  .  .  would constitute the triumvirate in the indigenization 
movement, each making strategic contributions to the common endeavor of 
constructing a national discourse on civilization.”31  Our discussion on 
Philippine postcolonial discourses, therefore, would focus on the theories and 
legacies of these three thinkers.   
 
Enriquez and Sikolohiyang Pilipino  
 
Virgilio G. Enriquez (1939-1994)32 started his career as a psychology 
professor at the University of the Philippines.  As early as 1965, he was already 
using Filipino as his medium of instruction.  He earned his doctor’s degree in 
social psychology from Northwestern University, in Illinois, in 1970.  Back in 
                                                 
28 Cf.  Lily Mendoza, Between the Homeland and the Diaspora: the Politics of Theorizing 
Filipino and Filipino American Identities (Manila: UST Publishing House, 2006), 52. 
29 Ibid., 53. 
30 Ibid., 54-63. 
31 Ibid., 63. 
32 This year of birth, 1939, is extrapolated from the fact that he died in 1994 at the age 
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his base university, he started to formulate and disseminate what would 
become the Sikolohiyang Pilipino (Filipino Psychology), otherwise known as 
sikolohiyang mapagpalaya (liberation psychology).  In 1975, he convened the First 
National Conference on Filipino Psychology.33  
He defines Sikolohiyang Pilipino as the systematic and scientific study of 
the Filipino “psychological make-up, society and culture” by Filipinos and for 
Filipinos.34   Enriquez believes that the Western psychological models are not 
only inadequate and inappropriate in profiling the Filipino mind but are 
themselves instruments of colonization.  By producing distorted understanding 
of ourselves and our world, Western psychology pull us deeper into the mire of 
colonial domination.  Sikolohiyang Pilipino, or sikolohiyang mapagpalaya, carries 
with it a programmatic project of multiple liberations.  First, by shifting its 
focus on the “appreciation and application of indigenous knowledge,” it is 
thought of as liberation of Filipino psychology from Western theories.35  
Second, by affirming the Filipino identity, it is envisioned as liberation of the 
Filipino mind from colonial inferiority complex.  Third, by bringing psychology 
to the level of popular culture, it is intended to liberate the less fortunate 
Filipinos from economic, cultural, and political oppression.   
Enriquez identifies some of the promising areas where his followers 
may focus their various researches: the psychology of children, games, food, 
emancipatory struggles, the different levels of relating to one’s fellowmen, 
healing practices, the discourse of the anting-anting  (charms and amulets), 
literature, arts, “and other aspects of popular and folk practices expressive of a 
different consciousness or, simply, of a different way of being.”36  
He emphasizes that our local research methods should be sensitive to 
the “cultural characteristics of the Filipino.”37  Hence, instead of blindly 
following the Western research protocols, he proposes that the local scholars 
should employ the following native ways of knowing: “pagtanong-tanong (“asking 
around”),  pakikiramdam (“shared inner perception”), panunuluyan (“staying 
with”), and pakikipamuhay (“living with”), among others.”38 
  Enriquez died from cancer in 1994, at the age of 55, leaving behind 
not only a number of followers and sympathizers for his postcolonial project, 
but also a formal organization Pambansang Samahan ng Sikolohiyang Pilipino 
(National Association of Filipino Psychology), as well as research center 
Akademya ng Sikolohiyang Pilipino (Academy of Filipino Psychology). 
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Covar and Pilipinolohiya  
Prospero R.  Covar (Born: 1934), earned his bachelor’s and master’s 
degrees in sociology at the University of the Philippines, and his doctor’s 
degree in anthropology at the University of Arizona.  It was in the University 
of the Philippines, while working as a professor of anthropology, where he 
developed the discourse of Pilipinolohiya in collaboration with his friend Zeus 
Salazar. 
Covar defines Pilipinolohiya as the systematic study of the Filipino 
psyche, culture, and society with the aim of building our national culture.39  As 
an inter-disciplinary study of Philippine culture, it analyzes language, arts, film, 
philosophy, religion, and all other local practices.   
Covar and Salazar conceptualize Pilipinolohiya as our counter-discourse 
to the more popular and internationally recognized ‘Philippine Studies’.  For 
them ‘Philippine Studies’ is a Euro-American generated knowledge about the 
Philippines.  As an exogenous discourse it has the tendency to distort their 
object, and as a colonial discourse it has a tacit motive of producing knowledge 
in order to gain tighter politico-economic control over its object.   Pilipinolohiya, 
on the other hand, is the Filipino scholars’ struggle to understand their own 
people, culture, and country.  As an endogenous discourse it seeks to 
overthrow the predominating Western sociological frames to understand the 
Filipino in his own terms, and as a postcolonial discourse it aims to disable the 
cultural basis of our neo-colonial present.   
The proponents of the Pilipinolohiya achieved a momentous tactical 
victory when Salazar became the dean of the College of Social Sciences and 
Philosophy of the University of the Philippines, and appointed Covar as the 
coordinator of the just over a decade old Philippine Studies program in 1989.  
Covar strategically translated the name ‘Philippine Studies’ into Pilipinolohiya, 
endowing the program with their postcolonial philosophy.   
  After serving their administrative terms, however, the name of the 
program was re-translated as Araling Pilipino.  Nevertheless, the two theorists 
are convinced that they have already created in the minds of the Filipino 
scholars the clear distinction between the colonial and exogenous ‘Philippine 
Studies’ and the postcolonial and endogenous Pilipinolohiya.40 
 
Salazar and Pantayong Pananaw 
 
Zeus A.  Salazar (Born: 1934) earned his bachelor’s degree in history at 
the University of the Philippines, and his doctor’s degree in ethnology at the 
Sorbonne University of Paris.  He had special trainings at the Ecole Nationale de 
Langues Orientales Vivantes in Paris, Freie Universitat Berlin, and Universiteit te 
                                                 
39 Quoted by Zeus Salazar, “Philippine Studies and Pilipinolohiya: Past, Present and 
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Leiden.  It was in the University of the Philippines, while working as a professor 
of history, where he developed the discourse of Pantayong Pananaw, reputed to 
be the most theoretically advanced and research productive among our local 
postcolonial discourse.41  
Ramon Guillermo, in his essay Exposition, Critique and New Directions for 
Pantayong Pananaw, translates Pantayong Pananaw as “from-us-for-us 
perspective.”42  It is a discourse about the Filipinos, constructed by the 
Filipinos, intended for the Filipino readers, and aimed at building the Filipino 
nation.   
If Enriquez considers Sikolohiyang Pilipino as our counter-discourse to 
the Western psychological theories; and Covar, Pilipinolohiya  to ‘Philippine 
Studies’; Salazar’s Pantayong Pananaw finds its discursive Other in what he calls 
the  Pangkaming Pananaw, which Guillermo translates as “from-us-for-you 
perspective.”  The historiographies of Teodoro Agoncillo and Renato 
Constantino, although postcolonial in their own right, would still belong to 
Pangkaming Pananaw, for the reason that they are still shackled by the semi-
conscious motive of writing about the Filipinos for Anglophone Western 
readers, or at least universal readers.43  Following Guillermo’s translation, 
Covar’s Euro-American generated ‘Philippine Studies’ would be a discourse 
coming from a from-them-for-all perspective, a Pangkayong Pananaw,  or 
Pangsilang Pananaw. 
The foundational postcolonial strategy of Salazar is to expel the 
domineering presence of the Euro-American Other in the Filipinos’ discourse 
about their own selves.  This presence could vary from the actual writing of a 
Euro-American scholar about the Philippines, to the more rampant process of 
a Filipino scholar’s naïve usage of a Euro-American social theory, or to the 
more subtle and often semi-conscious intention of a Filipino scholar of being 
understood by a wider Anglophone readership.  The first kind of presence had 
already been attacked fatally by Covar’s Pilipinolohiya, while the second kind of 
presence by Enriquez’ Sikolohiyang Pilipino.  Salazar’s Pantayong Pananaw most 
specifically attacks the third mode of the Euro-American Other’s presence in 
our discourse.  For him the conscious, or semi-conscious, desire of a Filipino 
scholar to be understood by a wider Anglophone readership would only goad 
him to study the Philippine realities using Euro-American terms, thereby 
endowing his discourse with a deep-seated tendency to distort its object.   
By making it clear at the outset that a Filipino scholar’s discourse is 
solely for the Filipino people and their task of nation building, it would be 
much easier to study the various Philippine realities in their own terms.   
Mendoza elaborates: “That way, he (Salazar) argues, Filipinos can discourse 
and communicate freely—in their own terms, in their own language, using their 
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own thought patterns and manner of relating and, most importantly, with their 
own interests (as Filipinos) kept in mind first and foremost.”44 
At 73 years old, Salazar is still at the peak of his intellectually 
productivity, remains in control of the organization Bagong Kasaysayan, and had 
already left a lasting influence on a generation of younger scholars.   Presently, 
Guillermo would state, Pantayong Pananaw is no longer an exclusive work of 
Salazar, but of “Jaime Veneracion, Nilo Ocampo, Ferdinand Llanes, Portia 
Reyes, Efren B.  Isorena, Vicente C.  Villan, Mary Jane Rodriguez-Tatel, Jose 
Rhommel B.  Hernandez, O.P., Myfel Joseph Paluga, Nancy Kimuell-Gabriel  .  
.  .  Atoy M.  Navarro,” and many more as well.45 
 
Fortifying Philippine Postcolonialism with Rorty’s 
Neopragmatism 
 
After more than half a century of existence, after their full emergence 
in the 1950s, the scattered Philippine postcolonial discourses remained largely 
confined within the progressive academic centers, where they are not even 
considered the dominant paradigms but merely alternative approaches.  They 
have yet to make a substantial impact on the resilient academic discourses 
nationwide, as well as on the much more resilient Filipino colonial mind.    
There seems to be some epistemological, political, directional, and 
modal difficulties obstructing the spreading out of these discourses.   In this 
section, we are going to take a closer look at these hindrances through the lens 
of Rorty’s neo-pragmatic political philosophy, with the intention of imagining 
possible Rortian-inspired solutions and remedies.    
The first of these hindrances is the hegemonic presence of empiricist 
and positivist social sciences in our academe.  Their adherents would 
expectedly sneer at our local postcolonial scholars’ nationalistic and anti-Euro-
American researches, which for them would be tantamount to a wanton 
disregard for the social sciences’ commitment for objectivity, neutrality, and 
discursive universality.  In academic settings where these empiricist and 
positivist scholars are more often than not the reigning intellectuals, our local 
postcolonialism would have tremendous difficulties in thriving, and much 
more in proliferating.   
The second of these hindrances is the dialectical inversion of the first 
hindrance; that is, the postmodern modes of inquiry that were able to slip 
through the old empiricist and positivist guards to become a rather powerful 
undercurrent in our academe.  If the hegemony of empiricism and positivism is 
already inhospitable to our postcolonial endeavors, its anti-thesis proved to be 
even hostile.  While our local postcolonial intellectuals are engrossed theorizing 
about the nation, nation building, national identity and the Filipino, these 
postmodern modes of inquiry suddenly swept through them and declared their 
key concepts nothing but floating signifiers, or words devoid of any contents.  
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“A common judgment is that the once fashionable ‘indigenization’ movements 
of the 1980s,” Guillermo writes, “have been rendered passé by the late 
‘postmodern’ 1990s.”46 
The resistance put up by empiricism and positivism on one hand, and 
the scathing conceptual implosions inflicted by postmodernism could be 
surpassed and eluded if our local postcolonialism would take shelter under 
Rorty’s neo-pragmatic epistemology.  Following Rorty, our scholars and 
students should be edified to think that after the linguistic turn, it is the 
hegemony of empiricism and positivism which is the one that is rendered 
passé.   The old empiricist and positivists guards are therefore not much of a 
problem, unlike the nihilistic forces brought about by the same linguistic turn 
and postmodernism.    
Rorty insists that even in a world without essences, philosophy, the 
natural sciences, the social sciences, cultural studies, and all other discourses, 
including postcolonialism, could still exist.  Randolf David, one of our few 
local followers of this American neo-pragmatist, asserts: “Rorty’s admonition 
that “sociologists and psychologists might stop asking themselves whether they 
are following rigorous scientific procedures, and start asking themselves 
whether they have any suggestions to make to their fellow citizens about how 
our lives, our institutions, should be changed” speaks to me profoundly and 
painfully.47  To refuse to surrender to the epistemological chaos sown by both 
the linguistic turn and postmodernism means to stop gauging a discourse in 
terms of its relationship to objects and essences, and to begin gauging it terms 
of its capacity to create and build a better future for humanity, where more 
freedom, more growth, more empathy, and more solidarity can be achieved.     
Following Rorty’s neo-pragmatic epistemology, we may re-imagine our 
local postcolonialism, as a tool, or more dramatically, a weapon, that we may 
use in rectifying the problems and violence inflicted on us by Spain and 
America.  Postcolonialism should be our way of hoping for a better future.  
Under Rorty’s neo-pragmatism, then, our local postcolonialism would not only 
be epistemologically legitimized, but would be endowed as well with an ethical 
force; for under this philosophy, actions that are effective in creating a better 
future for humanity are seen as morally superior to actions that are ineffective.    
The third of these hindrances is the vulnerability of our nationalistic 
postcolonialism from fascist and capitalist subversions.  Ma. Cynthia Rose 
Banzon-Bautista, in her essay The Social Sciences in the Philippines, presents the 
strife that ripped apart the nationalist solidarity among the intellectuals at the 
University of the Philippines: “At the height of authoritarian rule, social 
scientists exchanged polemical barbs.  Those who worked with the Marcos 
administration were accused of legitimizing its dictatorial designs and the crony 
capitalism it fostered.  On the other hand, those critical of colleagues who 
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worked with government were charged with hiding in their ivory tower, 
unmindful of pressing societal problems.”48 
In the 1970s, Covar was already drawn into the Philippine Center for 
Advanced Studies (PCAS), the identity of the University of the Philippine’s 
Asian Center in the years 1973 to 1979 when Ferdinand Marcos tasked it to 
work for his policy, strategy, and ideological needs.49  Aside from its usual 
teaching and research activities, it appeared that the PCAS collaborated with 
the dictator on a general “Cultural Liberation Program” that included among 
other things the more specific “Pre-Departure Orientation Seminars” for all 
government workers who were leaving for some specific assignments abroad.50  
Salazar was similarly lured into the same academic center, but had a deeper 
involvement with the dictator’s ideological schemes.  Together with Dr.   
Serafin Quiason, Dr. Romeo Cruz, Dr. Samuel Tan, and many other nationalist 
intellectuals, he ventured to ghostwrite Marcos’ multivolume historical work, 
the Tadhana.51    
Among the triumvirate of our local indigenization movement, it is only 
Enriquez who was spared from a compromising association with the fascist 
regime.   Of the three indigenizing discourses, it was Sikolohiyang Pilipino that 
contains the most revolutionary impulse, for it promises to liberate the less 
fortunate Filipinos from economic, cultural and political oppression.     
However, the forces of capitalism and Imperialism seemed to have succeeded 
in doing what Marcos failed to do.   Recording, broadcast and consultancy 
outfits swiftly appropriated the indigenizing insights of Sikolohiyang Pilipino for 
the service of capitalism, subverting the movement’s revolutionary impulse and 
converting it into a commodity or a tool for selling other commodities.52  At 
the height of his intellectual prowess, Enriquez was enticed to various places in 
Asia and America to lecture on the Diaspora and comparative psychology, 
draining his energies and distracting him from the much needed theoretical and 
organizational tasks left in Manila.  Captivated to address a growing 
Anglophone audience, he set aside his commitment to speak and think in the 
Filipino language.  At one point, Salazar accused him of betraying the 
philosophy of indigenization.53  
Even Agoncillo, the father of our nationalist historiography, was not 
able to escape the discursive subversion of the Marcos regime.   Reynaldo Ileto, 
one of the leading Filipino historians and historiographers, comments: 
“Agoncillo especially was co-opted by the Marcos state .  .  .  Agoncillo’s 
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history and Marcos’ history were the same banana, or the same thing.”54  
Constantino, although rabidly anti-Marcos, unfortunately gravitated into the 
lair of a feudal, industrialist and capitalist group, the Lopez family.   Mendoza 
mentions other intellectuals whose commitments to nationalism were 
blemished by their stint at the PCAS: the sociologist Ruben Santos-Cuyugan, 
the anthropologists Juan Francisco and F.  Landa Jocano, the political scientist 
Eric Lacanlale, International Studies experts Josefa Saniel, Armando Malay, Jr., 
Roxy Lim and Benito Lim, and many more.55  
These scholars might have worked without sharing the regime’s 
malice, and might have been too sincere with their nationalistic fervor, but 
their very alliance had revealed clearly how vulnerable our local postcolonialism 
is to fascist and capitalist exploitation.   Without condemning them, the fact 
remains that their involvement with Marcos had dampened the enthusiasm for 
nationalism and anti-colonialism of the other more politically stringent scholars 
and sympathizers.  The past may be the past, and there are more and more 
intellectuals who tend to forgive even Heidegger for his membership with 
Adolf Hitler’s Nazi party, but no one should also stop us from learning from 
our collective experiences to prevent any possible repetition of such fascist and 
capitalist subversions.  To give our local postcolonial scholars a fuller 
perspective of the present, it would be advantageous for them to take a similar 
position that Rorty took, the left.  From the perspective of the left, fascism and 
unrestrained capitalism would appear more clearly as suspicious and terrifying 
forces.  Just as Rorty called the American left, the party of hope, we may also 
call the leftist perspective, the position of hope.   
 Closely related to the third hindrance is the fourth one which has 
something to do with the parallelism between our local postcolonialism and the 
American cultural left.  Although our postcolonial discourses share nothing of 
the American cultural left’s timbre of hopelessness, pessimism, and the feeling 
of shame for their country, the two discourses are similar in their lack of 
attention to the economic and political components of oppression.     
Sikolohiyang Pilipino, Pilipinolohiya and Pantayong Pananaw might be professing to 
be interdisciplinary movements, and indeed to a large extent they are, we have 
to admit the fact that they lack substantial following among the local political 
scientists and economists.    
Philippine postcolonialism, consumed as it is with burning hope, 
dazzling optimism, and exuberant pride for our country, should not be 
contented in ‘psychoanalyzing’ the colonial present.  It should heed Rorty’s 
admonition for the American cultural left, that it should move forward by 
coming up with concrete legislative and action-oriented suggestions that are 
capable of making the future more humane with more freedom, more growth, 
more empathy and more solidarity.  There seems to be an urgent need for our 
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11%20Discussion2.pdf>, 11 October 2007, 4. 
55 Mendoza, op cit., footnote 11, 58-59.  
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postcolonial discourses to dialogue with the isolated political and economic 
theories of our local scholars such as Walden Bello, Ricardo Ferrer, Temario 
Rivera, Edilberto Villegas and Joel Rocamora, who study not only the local 
modes of oppression but the global as well.    
Closely related to the fourth hindrance is the fifth one which has 
something to do with the still inadequate alliance of our postcolonial theories 
with the other disciplines, especially with the more creative and emotive 
discourses, such as literature, the arts, popular culture, and mass 
communication.  Rorty’s neo-pragmatism has de-emphasized the boundaries 
between disciplines and has placed the stress, instead, on their collective tasks 
of generating new languages and vocabularies that are leading towards a desired 
change.  “The method,” he argues, “is to redescribe lots and lots of things in 
new ways, until you have created a pattern of linguistic behavior which will 
tempt the rising generation to adopt it.”56  
Alliance with literature, the arts, popular culture, and mass 
communication is very crucial because they can more powerfully reinterpret the 
present and affectively slither into the convictions of the Filipinos.  Rorty’s 
philosophy suggests that our local postcolonialism should be thoroughly inter-
disciplinary in its generation of a new way of thinking that would surpass our 
colonial culture.    
The sixth of these hindrances has something to do with the purism, 
exclusivity, and inwardness of our three leading postcolonial discourses.   
Because of their collective strategy of understanding the Filipino in his own 
terms using his own language, they have the tendency to draw out a smaller 
and smaller circle of discursive legitimacy.  Such a small circle prohibits the 
intellectual participation of scholars who are Western, or Anglophone, or 
Filipino using imported frameworks.  Patricio Abinales, a leftist theorist in the 
Diaspora who himself feels being a victim of this discursive elimination, notes 
that it is this same purism, exclusivity and inwardness among the social 
scientists of the University of the Philippines that is already generating harmful 
signs of intellectual inbreeding.57  Guillermo, on the other hand, is trying to 
persuade the current exponents of Pantayong Pananaw to address the problem of 
linguistic exclusivity by establishing “communication and translation 
protocols” so as to “facilitate a more productive intellectual interaction 
between Filipino and English language traditions in Philippine social 
sciences.”58 
  The concerns of Abinales and Guillermo would become more urgent 
w h e n  r e a d  s i d e  b y  s i d e  w i t h  R o r t y ’ s  c r i t i q u e  o f  g l o b a l i z a t i o n .   F o r  R o r t y ,  
communication channels should be opened up, not in order for us to do 
business with, or to get an employment from, the global overclass, but in order 
for the leftist intellectuals of all nations to band together and raise their fellow 
citizens’ consciousness about the dangers and threats spawned by globalization.  
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Under the dispensation of globalization, there is a strong pressure for our local 
postcolonialism to more and more relax its principles of purism, exclusivity 
and inwardness.   The leftist intellectuals of the world have the global burden 
of pressuring their respective governments to lobby for a more powerful global 
polity that would be capable of moderating and controlling the otherwise 
immoderate and uncontrollable transnational corporations.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper, therefore, had explored the political philosophy of Rorty 
by examining his concept of truth, ethical theory, notion of philosophy, general 
political theory, critique of the American left, and his critique of globalization.  
Then, it studied our postcolonialism, specifically its emergence and its three 
most robust movements, Enriquez’ Sikolohiyang Pilipino, Covar’s Pilipinolohiya, 
and Salazar’s Pantayong Pananaw.  It proceeded to unearth some of the problems 
that are hindering our local postcolonial discourse from succeeding in altering 
the widespread and well-ingrained Filipino colonial mind.   As it analyzed the 
problems from the hegemony of empiricist and positivist social sciences, the 
presence of postmodernism, the episodes of fascist and capitalist subversions, 
the lack of economic and political perspectives, the lack of alliance with the 
more creative and emotive discourses, and our postcolonialism’s inherent 
tendency towards purism, exclusivity and inwardness, this paper attempts to 
offer possible Rortian-inspired solutions and remedies.   
  Privileging Rorty’s neo-pragmatic philosophy as the framework of 
critiquing our local postcolonialism will definitely not make the majority of our 
local theorists happy.  But this paper, definitely, chose Rorty as an analytic tool 
not because he is an Anglo-American philosopher, but because he tackled 
issues that have striking resonances with what is happening to our local 
theorizing.   After closely studying his neo-pragmatic philosophy, it becomes 
undeniable that he possesses a trove of lessons that would be very useful in 
further developing postcolonial thought in the Philippines.  Salazar, one of the 
staunchest guard against theoretical borrowings, leaves a small door open for 
this kind of activity as long as the theories are “properly nuanced and critically 
appropriated to suit the Filipino context.”59 
 
Department of Filipino, De La Salle University-Manila, Philippines 
  
References 
 
Abinales, Patricio, “A Question of Generations: Discussion on Reynaldo 
Ileto’s Conference Paper,” in Workshop 2001 for the Academic Frontier 
Project, Institute for International Studies, Meiji Gakuin University, 
<http://www.meijigakuin.ac.jp/~iism/frontier/Proceedings/10%20C
ommentary%202%20P.N.Abinales.pdf>, 10 October 2007.  
                                                 
59 Mendoza, op cit., 86.  
 
 
28     RICHARD RORTY’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
___________, “Question of Location,” in Korakora Projects 
<http://www.korakora.org/projects/?q=node/71>, 02 October 
2003. 
Abrera, Bernadette and Dedina Lapar eds., “Malayang Talakayan: Ikalimang 
Araw: Marso 31, 1989,” in Paksa, Paraan at Pananaw sa Kasaysayan: Ulat 
ng Unang Pambansang Kumperensya sa Historiograpiyang Pilipino (Quezon 
City: UP-Departamento ng Kasaysayan, 1989), 208-217. 
Adleman, Dan, “Richard Rorty, 1931-2007,” in The Republic of East Vancouver, 
166 (June 21-July 4, 2007) <http://www.republic-
news.org/archive/166-repub/166_adleman.htm>, 14 September 2007. 
Antolihao, Lou, “Modernity and the Underdevelopment of Sociological 
Theory in the Philippines,” in Philippine Sociological Review, 47 (January-
December 1999), 1-8. 
Balco, Bryan, Limos, Loise Laine and  Jacqueline Chua, “Si Zeus sa Tuktok ng 
Mt. Olympus,”  in The Bedan: Opisyal ng Pahagan ng mga mag-aaral ng 
Kolehiya ng San Beda-Mendiola, 65 :4 (August 2007).  
Banzon-Bautista, Maria Cynthia Rose, “The Social Sciences in the Philippines: 
Reflections on Trends and Developments,” in Philippine Studies, 48 
(2000), 175-208. 
Best, Steven and Kellner, Douglas, “Richard Rorty and Postmodern Theory,” 
in  UCLA Graduate School of Education and Information Studies 
<http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/essays/richardrortypostm
oderntheory.pdf>, 14 Sept 2007. 
Cruz, Romeo, “Ang Paggawa ng Tadhana Mula 1980,” in Paksa, Paraan at 
Pananaw sa Kasaysayan: Ulat ng Unang Pambansang Kumperensya sa 
Historiograpiyang Pilipino (Quezon City: UP-Departamento ng 
Kasaysayan, 1989), 200-203. 
David, Randolf, “De-Professionalizing Sociology,” in Reflections on Sociology and 
Philippine Society (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 
2001), 3-14.  
___________, “Philippine Sociology: In Search of an Alternative Agenda,” in 
Reflections on Sociology and Philippine Society (Quezon City: University of 
the Philippines Press, 2001), 15-28.  
___________, “Sociology in the Postmodern World,” in Philippine Sociological 
Review, 46:1-2 (January-June 1998), 76-84. 
Enriquez, Virgilio, Colonial to Liberation Psychology: The Philippine Experience 
(Manila: De La Salle University Press, 1994). 
Fernadez, Erwin Soriano, “Decolonizing the Filipino: Cultural Intellectual 
Revolution in Contemporary Phillippines,” in Asia Culture Forum 2006 
<http://www.cct.go.kr/data/acf2006/aycc/aycc1402Erwin%20Sorian
o% 20Fernandez.pdf>, 03 October 2007. 
Guillermo, Ramon, “Exposition, Critique and New Directions for Pantayong 
Pananaw,” in Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia, (March 2003) 
<http://kyotoreview.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/issue/issue2/article_247. 
html>, 02 October 2007.  
 
 
F.  DEMETERIO     29 
Guerrero, Leon Ma., “The Strange Ratooning of Filipino Nationalism,” in We 
Filipinos (Manila: The Daily Star Publishing Company, 1984), 54-58.  
Haack, Susan, “Pragmatism: Addendum,” in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 7. 
Second Edition (Detroit: Thomson Gale, 2006), 749-750.  
Ileto, Reynaldo, “Discussion on Reynaldo Ileto’s Paper ‘On the Historiography 
in the Philippines’,” in Workshop 2001 for the Academic Frontier Project, 
Institute for International Studies, Meiji Gakuin University 
<http://www.meijigakuin.ac.jp/~iism/frontier/Proceedings/11%20
Discussion2.pdf>, 11 October 2007.  
Jose, F. Sionil, “The Solidarity Interview with Teodoro Agoncillo,” in 
Conversations with Teodoro Andal Agoncillo (Manila: De La Salle University 
Press, 1995), 145-191. 
Lopez, Muriel, “An Intellectual History of Virgilio Enriquez,” in Office of 
Institutional Research of California State University, San Bernardino 
<http://ir.csusb.edu/~muriel/ucdd/papersthings/ENRIQUE2.pdf>, 
04 October 2007.  
Lynch, Michael, “Richard Rorty,” in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 8. Second 
Edition (Detroit: Thomson Gale, 2006), 493-495.  
Mendieta, Eduardo, “Postcolonialism,” in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol 7. 
Second Edition (Detroit: Thomson Gale, 2006). 726-729.  
Mendoza, Lily, Between the Homeland and the Diaspora: the Politics of Theorizing 
Filipino and Filipino American Identities (Manila: UST Publishing House, 
2006). 
Nystrom,  Derek and Kent Puckett, “Against Oligarchies: A Conversation with 
Richard Rorty,” in Prickly Paradigm Press, Chicago <http://www.prickly-
paradigm.com/paradigm3.pdf>, 14 September 2007. 
Pertierra, Raul, “Introduction: From Society of Prowess to a Knowledge 
Regime,” in Philippine Localities and Global Perspectives: Essays on Society and 
Culture (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1995), 1-14. 
Pineda, Ofreneo, “Renato Constantino: Biographical Sketch, Ideological 
Profile,” in Partisan Scholarship: Essays in Honor of Renato Constantino 
(Manila: Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers, 1989), 1-10. 
Rood, Steven, “Nationalism and the Filipinization of Social Sciences,” in 
Culture of Nationalism in Contemporary Philippine Society: Conference 
Proceedings (Baguio City: Cordillera Studies Center, 1995), 118-127. 
Rorty, Richard, Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998). 
___________,  Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989). 
___________, Philosophy and Social Hope (London: Penguin Books, 1999). 
___________,  Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1979). 
Rumana, Richard, On Rorty (Sidney: Wadsworth, 2000). 
Salazar, Zeus, “Ang Historiograpiya ng Tadhana: Isang Malayang Paggunita-
Panayam,” in Paksa, Paraan at Pananaw sa Kasaysayan: Ulat ng Unang  
 
 
30     RICHARD RORTY’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
Pambansang Kumperensya sa Historiograpiyang Pilipino (Quezon City: UP-
Departamento ng Kasaysayan, 1989), 193-199. 
___________, The Malayan Connection: Ang Pilipinas sa Dunia Melayu (Quezon 
City: Palimbagan ng Lahi, 1998). 
San Juan, Epifanio Jr., “Prospects for Transformation in the Philippines in the 
Next Millenium,” in the Austrian-Philippine Website 
<http://www.univie.ac.at/Voelkerkunde/apsis/aufi/ history/sonny2. 
htm>, 02 October 2007. 
___________, “Reactionary Tendencies in the U.S. Production of Knowledge 
About the Filipino/The Philippines,” in Bulatlat.Com, 40 (November 
2001) <http://www.bulatlat.com/archive2/040sanjuan.html>, 04 
October 2007. 
Thayer, H.S., “Philosophical Schools and Doctrines: Pragmatism,” The New 
Encyclopedia Britannica: Macropedia, 15th Edition (Chicago: Encyclopedia 
Britannica Inc., 1992), 636-640. 
___________, “Pragmatism.” Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 7. Second Edition 
(Detroit: Thomson Gale, 2006), 741-748.  
Tiongson, Nicanor, Doronilla, Ma. Luisa, Guillermo, Alice, and Fe Mangahas, 
“The Ideology and Cutlure of the New Society,” in Synthesis: Before and 
After February 1986: The Edgar M. Jopson Memorial Lectures (Manila: 
Edgar M. Jopson Memorial Foundation, 1986), 49-65.  
Turner, William, “Pragmatism,” in The Catholic Encyclopedia 
<http://newadvent.org/ cathen/12333b.htm>, 14 September 2007. 